Role of Corporate Governance in the

Financial Crisis; Evidence from

Nigerian Banks by Oyewole, S.O. et al.
IBIMA Publishing  
Journal of Accounting and Auditing: Research & Practice  
http://www.ibimapublishing.com/journals/JAARP/jaarp.html  
Vol. 2015 (2015), Article ID 367443, 14 pages  
DOI: 10.5171/2015.367443 
______________ 
 
Cite this Article as: Oyewole Oyedayo Sharon, Olusanmi Olamide and Owolabi Folashade (2015), " Role of 
Corporate Governance in the Financial Crisis; Evidence from Nigerian Banks", Journal of Accounting and 
Auditing: Research & Practice , Vol. 2015 (2015), Article ID 367443, DOI: 10.5171/2015.367443 
 
Research Article 
Role of Corporate Governance in the 
 Financial Crisis; Evidence from  
Nigerian Banks 
 
Oyewole Oyedayo Sharon, Olusanmi Olamide and Owolabi Folashade 
 
Covenant University, Ota, Nigeria 
Correspondence should be addressed to: Oyewole Oyedayo Sharon; 
oyedayo.oyewole@covenantuniversity.edu.ng 
 
Received date: 6 March 2014; Accepted date: 10 August 2014; Published date: 14 October 2015 
 
Copyright © 2015. Oyewole Oyedayo Sharon, Olusanmi Olamide and Owolabi Folashade. Distributed 
under Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Corporate governance is crucial to the 
integrity of corporations, financial 
institutions, and central to the health and 
stability of economies. Corporate governance 
is the set of processes, customs, policies, 
laws, and institutions affecting the way a 
corporation (or company) is directed, 
administered or controlled. Cherupalli 
(2011) explained that Sound corporate 
governance is reliant on external 
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marketplace commitment and legislation, 
plus a healthy board culture which 
safeguards policies and processes as 
mentioned by. Every business endeavour 
involves risks that could present threats to 
its success, and management of such is 
crucial to the business. Risk is the chance that 
an investment's actual return will 
be different from the expected, that is; the 
quantifiable likelihood of loss or less-than-
expected returns. It includes the possibility 
of losing some or all of the original 
investment. Munger (2011) suggests that 
Risk should be measured, avoided if possible, 
and a margin of safety determined. Sloan 
(2011) mentioned that banking by nature of 
its operations is highly risky. Banks 
safeguard money and provide credit and 
render payment services such as checking 
accounts, debit cards, and cashier's checks. 
Banks may also offer investment and 
insurance products. Sobodu & Akiode (1998) 
opined that through the financial 
intermediation function and the spread of 
bank branches, they were relied on to take 
result-oriented approach to export 
promotion, diversification and the revamping 
of industrial development and growth in 
Nigeria.   
 
Discovery of the causes of an economic 
phenomenon is very crucial to the future 
prevention mechanisms and sustainability of 
the recovered system. The recent global 
financial crisis was caused by some 
phenomenal factors. In a research study by 
Ernst & Young (2010), it was found that the 
financial crisis exposed inherent weakness in 
the risk management system; soiled 
infrastructures, disparate systems and 
processes, fragmented decision-making, 
inadequate forecasting and a dearth of 
cohesive reporting, among others. The 
Association of Certified Chartered 
Accountants (2008) mentioned that many of 
the causal factors that caused the financial 
crisis seem to be inextricably linked to a 
noncompliance with corporate governance 
policies. 
 
 
Nigerian Financial Sector Crisis 
 
The Nigerian banking sector is sensitive to 
the economic and financial wellbeing of the 
country. Soludu (2009) stated that the 
financial system is dominated by the banking 
sector (about 90% of the assets and about 
65% of the market capitalization of the 
Nigerian Stock Exchange). It is the key driver 
of the economy with new credit to the 
private sector expected to exceed the 
combined spending by three tiers of 
government. In 2005, this sector experienced 
a major reform as banks were consolidated 
through mergers and acquisitions, raising the 
capital base from N2 billion to a minimum of 
N25 billion, which reduced the number of 
commercial banks from 89 to 25 and later to 
24 and currently 16. Sanusi (2011) 
mentioned that beyond the need to 
recapitalize the banks, the reforms focused 
on ensuring minimal reliance on the public 
sector for funds, but rather relying on the 
private sector. In a research study by Ernst 
and Young (2010), it was found that as the 
focus on risk intensifies, organizations are 
enhancing their management of key risks, 
which include: credit risk as top of the 
agenda; operational risk, liquidity risk, 
market risk, and reputational risk. 
 
Credit risk which is placed as a priority is 
explained by Chin (2010) as the possibility of 
loss due to a debtor's non-payment of a loan 
or other line of credit (either the principal, 
interest or both). The default events include a 
delay in repayments, restructuring of 
borrower repayments, bankruptcy of the 
firm and has negative consequences for the 
economy. Chike-obi (2011) revealed that 
over N770 billion has been spent by the 
government on buying the bad loans of 
Nigerian banks. 
 
In a research study by Barfield & Venkat 
(2010), it was found that during the times of 
financial crisis, risks have repeatedly shown 
a tendency to transform from one type to 
another with breath-taking speed. We have 
seen, for example, how mistrust of asset 
values due to credit default risk can generate 
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liquidity risk. So, going forward, banks will 
need to place greater emphasis on 
developing an integrated view of risk across 
all the risk types. Andre (2009) noted that 
most banking crises have had as direct 
causes, the inadequate management of credit 
risk and after East Asian economies collapsed 
in the late 20th century, the World Bank's 
president warned those countries, that for 
sustainable development, corporate 
governance has to be firm. 
 
Banks in Nigeria were recapitalised in 2005 
requiring, from each bank, a minimum capital 
base of N25billion. With the huge amount of 
funds that are available to them, banks have 
been financing more long-term mega projects 
in the real sectors of the economy as opposed 
to the existing working capital/trade 
financing.  
 
The financial crisis in the Nigerian Banking 
Sector can be specifically attributed to the 
huge loss suffered by most of the banks in the 
form of non-performing loans which suggests 
poor credit risk management. In a research 
study by Soludo (2009), it was discovered 
that 8 of the Nigerian banks had issued out 
loans without observing due process, also 
some loans were not serviced and no action 
was taken by the bank which resulted in 
N620billion loss for poor credit management. 
This draws attention to the effectiveness and 
efficiency of their credit risk management 
principles, which in turn questions their 
compliance with corporate governance 
policies.  
  
Corporate Governance 
 
In April 2003, the Code of Best Practices on 
Corporate Governance in Nigeria was 
published and the implementation process 
began immediately. O'Donovan (2006)  
defines corporate governance as 'an internal 
system encompassing policies, processes and 
people, which serves the needs of 
shareholders and other stakeholders, by 
directing and controlling management 
activities with good business savvy, 
objectivity, accountability and integrity. 
Sound corporate governance is reliant on 
external marketplace commitment and 
legislation, plus a healthy board culture 
which safeguards policies and processes. 
Catherine and John (2002) explained 
corporate governance as a means whereby 
society can be sure that large corporations 
are well-run institutions to which investors 
and lenders can confidently commit their 
funds. It is now increasingly clear that having 
a transparent and fair system to govern 
markets, fair treatment of all stakeholders, 
and a chance for every entrepreneur with a 
good product to be successful, are important 
to democracy. Corporate governance creates 
safeguards against corruption and 
mismanagement, while promoting the 
fundamental values of a market economy in a 
democratic society. Vijaianand (2009) 
identified the key elements of corporate 
governance principles as follows: Honesty; 
Trust and integrity; Openness; Performance 
orientation; Responsibility and 
accountability; Mutual respect; and 
Commitment to the organization. 
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria’s code of 
corporate governance for banks in Nigeria 
post consolidation  
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria (2006) stated 
guidelines for corporate governance which 
specifically address the governance of banks 
in Nigeria. These guidelines are referred to as 
code of corporate governance and they cover 
every recognised matter of governance in 
banks. This new code therefore was 
developed to compliment the earlier ones 
and enhance their effectiveness for the 
Nigerian banking industry. Compliance with 
the provisions of this code is mandatory. The 
policies of the code are stated as follows: 
 
Credit Risk Management 
 
Rose & Hudgins (2005) define Credit risk as 
the probability that some of the bank’s assets 
will decline in value and perhaps become 
worthless. Chin (2010) explains Credit risk as 
the possibility of loss due to a debtor's non-
payment of a loan or other line of credit 
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(either the principal, interest or both). The 
default events include a delay in repayments, 
restructuring of borrower repayments, and 
bankruptcy. The Central Bank of Nigeria 
(2006) Code of Corporate Governance 
includes some credit risk management 
policies: 
 
1. The Board Credit Committee should 
have neither the Chairman of the 
Board nor the Managing Director as 
its chairman. 
2. The Board Credit Committee should 
be composed of members 
knowledgeable in credit analysis. 
 
Agency Theory  
 
The main issue in the principal/agency 
literature is centred on asymmetric 
information because outside owners do not 
have access to full information on corporate 
performance or the reasons for under-
performance. Sadiq, Oyebola & Abdulrasheed 
(2011) mentioned that the separation of 
ownership and control, which occurs as a 
result of the introduction of external 
investors, brings to the fore the agency 
problem: managers are expected to 
represent the interest of the external owners. 
 
Kieiman (2011) explains Agency theory to 
suggest that the firm can be viewed as a 
nexus of contracts between resource holders. 
An agency relationship arises whenever the 
principals hire agents, to perform some 
services and then delegate decision-making 
authority to the agents. The primary agency 
relationships in business are those between 
stockholders and managers; and between 
debt holders and stockholders. 
 
Eisenhardt (1989) mentioned that there is 
likely to be conflict between the interests of 
principals and agents. However, the 
management decisions of a bank should be in 
line with the Principal-agent relationships 
and should reflect efficient organization of 
information and risk-bearing costs.
 
                     
 
Figure 1: Agency Theory Framework 
 
Source: Developed By the Researcher 
 
This diagram represents the relationship 
between corporate governance and credit 
risk management on the platform of agency 
theory. Agency theory majorly backs up the 
contractual agreement between the 
proprietor and the agent. The agents have 
been identified as bank management and 
credit risk management is one of their major 
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responsibilities. Bank owners have been 
identified as proprietors who have corporate 
governance as their major concern. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Awoyemi (2009) explains that there exists a 
huge incentive to foster the strategic 
development of ‘cordial’ relationships and 
back door channels with regulators to feed 
the private sector’s desire for an edge in 
business. He identified this as a strong point 
for further research since the 
implementation of corporate governance 
largely depends on regulation. Ericsson & 
Renault (2006) noted that a rapidly growing 
body of literature has focused on credit risk 
and this further stresses the importance of 
credit risk management. The Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(2004) stated that one of the most influential 
guidelines has been the 1999 OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance. This was 
revised in 2004. The OECD remains a 
proponent of corporate governance 
principles throughout the world. 
 
In a research study by Eduardus, 
Hermeindito, Putu & Supriyatna (2007) it 
was found that the relationships between 
corporate governance and credit risk 
management; and between corporate 
governance and bank performance are 
sensitive to the type of bank ownership. 
Foreign-owned banks have better 
implemented corporate governance than 
have joint venture- owned banks, state-
owned banks, and private domestic-owned 
banks. Joan, Anthony & Anthony (2009) 
emphasize the impact of the strength of the 
board of directors and constructed an 
indicator of board strength. They concluded 
that board strength does not have a 
significant impact on capital risk, credit risk 
nor liquidity risk in Ghanaian banks. 
Greuning and Bratanovic (2004) argued that 
each of the key players in the corporate 
governance process (such as shareholders, 
directors, executive managers, and internal 
and external auditors) is responsible for 
some component of financial and operational 
risk management. Verriest & Gaeremynck 
(2008) hypothesized that in a changing 
accounting environment; better governed 
firms will provide a better financial 
restatement quality. The results largely 
confirm this prediction. 
 
Methodology 
 
Fox (2002) states a general regression model 
as: yit = α + β'Xit + uit.  
 
Takang & Ntui (2008) in analysing the 
relationship between bank performance and 
credit risk management stated their model 
as: 
 
P (ROA, ROE) = α + βNPL/TL+μ 
 
Joan et. al., (2009) examined the impact of 
corporate governance of Ghanaian banks on 
the management of bank capital risk, credit 
risk, and liquidity risk. The relationship is 
hypothesized as: 
Yjit=Ajit Xkit+ ϵjit 
 
Verriest & Gaeremynck (2008) examined the 
impact of corporate governance on IFRS and 
modelled the relationship as follows: 
 
QRIFRSi CORPGOVi 
ControlVar iablesi  
 
The regression model for this study was 
therefore adapted from the 4 models stated 
above:  
CR (NPL, LLP, LDR)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit 
+ βBCit + βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit  
  
Where: 
 
CR is the dependent variable, the variable we 
wish to explain or predict which is credit risk 
management (NPL, LLP, LDR). 
CG is the independent variable, also called 
the predictor variable; which is, corporate 
governance (SC, CI, BS, BC, ED, DI,). 
α is the intercept and  
β is the parameter of explanatory variable  
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μ represents the disturbance terms. 
i represent all the 19 banks in the sample; 
and  
 
t the 5 time period. 
 
Thus, three equations are implied in equation 
(1), one each for non – performing loans 
ratio, loan loss provision and loans to 
deposits ratio. The explanatory variables are 
repeated for the dependent variable. 
CR (NPL)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + βBCit + 
βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit  --------------- (1) 
CR (LLP)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + βBCit + 
βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit  ---------------- (2)                 
CR (LDR)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + βBCit + 
βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit  ---------------- (3) 
Each of the equations is applied for the 
relevant hypothesis test 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. 
Ordinary Least Square analysis was carried out 
on the panel data using Eviews 7.  
 
Credit Risk Management Variables 
 
Non-Performing Loans Ratio (NPL) 
 
Chang (2006) stated that loan is represented 
by total loans and advances in notes to the 
financial statement. Banks have realised that 
revenue maximising does not protect them 
from losses due to non–performing loans. 
The values for Non–performing loans are 
extracted from the analysis of loans and 
advances by performance. The formula for 
deriving the ratio is expressed below: 
 
NPL = Non–performing Loans  
 Total Loans    
 
Loan Loss Provision (LLP) 
 
Chang (2006) mentioned that it is important 
for each bank to have a proportion of the 
total loans in non – performing loans, on 
which the bank has to build provisions. This 
estimates what percentage of the total loans 
has been provided for. The formula for 
deriving the ratio is expressed below: 
 
LLP = Provision for Loan Losses 
 Total Loans 
 
In a study by Joan et. al. (2009), it was found 
that the higher this provision becomes, 
relative to the size of total loans, the riskier a 
bank becomes. Credit risk, defined as the 
ratio of loan loss provision to total loans. This 
ratio is commonly used in literature. 
Eduardus et. al. (2007) explained that a high 
ratio is considered as an indicator of poor 
credit risk management. Loan is represented 
by total loan in the balance sheet.  
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria requires all 
banks to make provisions for their loans 
according to the loan classification: 
Performing loans (past due <1day–89days) 
to be set at 1%; Standard loans (past due 
>90days–179days) to be set at 10%; 
Doubtful loans (past due >180days–359days) 
to be set at 50%; Lost loans (past due 
(>360days) to be set at 100% (CBN 
Prudential Guideline, 2010). 
Loans to deposits ratio (LDR)  
 
Loans are represented by total loans and 
advances in notes to the financial statement, 
whilst the deposits include demand deposits, 
time deposits, fixed deposits, current 
deposits, and savings. The total deposits 
value is extracted from the liabilities section 
of the balance sheet, referred to as customer 
deposits. Eduardus et. al (2007) noted that 
this ratio shows the proportion of public 
contribution as a source of capital to finance 
the banks’ loans. Smaller LDR number 
indicates that public provides smaller 
proportion to support the banks’ loans. The 
formula for deriving the ratio is expressed 
below: 
 
LDR = Total Loans 
            Total Deposits 
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Corporate Governance Variables 
 
Statutory Committee (SC)  
 
The Central Bank of Nigeria by the code of 
corporate governance 2006 requires each of 
the banks in Nigeria to have at least the 
following 3 committees: audit committee; 
credit committee; and risk committee. 
Therefore, data were gathered on the 
existence of these committees in each of the 
observations, checking whether the bank had 
none that is, 0; all 3; 1 or 2 of these 
committees.  
 
Committee Independence (CI)  
 
The Central Bank also requires that neither 
the chairman of the board nor the managing 
director/chief executive officer should be a 
member or chairman of any of the existing 
committees. This is to ensure independence 
of these committees of the board of directors. 
The committees of observations that had 
either the chairman or the managing 
director/chief executive officer as a member 
or chairman were regarded as dependent 
and represented by dummy value ‘0’; while 
the committees of observations that had 
neither the chairman of the board or the 
managing director/chief executive officer as 
a member or chairman are regarded as 
independent and represented by dummy 
value ‘1’.  
 
Board Size (BS)  
 
It is also required by the Central Bank that 
the board of directors of any bank in Nigeria 
does not exceed a total of 20 directors. Data 
were practically gathered by counting the 
number of directors listed as members of the 
board. The total membership of the board of 
directors includes: The chairman, the 
managing director/chief executive director, 
executive directors and non–executive 
directors. 
 
 
 
 
Board Composition (BC)  
 
It is required by the 2006 Central Bank of 
Nigeria code of corporate governance that 
the board of directors comprises of the 
chairman, the managing director/chief 
executive director, executive directors and 
non–executive directors. The chairman of the 
board is a non–executive director, while the 
managing director/ chief executive officer is 
an executive director. It is further stated that 
the number of non–executive directors 
should exceed that of executive directors. 
Hence, in gathering data, where the executive 
directors exceeded the nonexecutive 
directors or are the same number, it was 
represented by dummy value ‘0’ and where 
the non–executive directors exceeded the 
executive directors, it was represented by 
dummy value ‘1’. 
Executive Duality (ED) 
 
 The Central Bank of Nigeria, in the 2006 
code of corporate governance also requires 
that the position of chairman of the board of 
directors and managing director/chief 
executive officer should not be vested in one 
person or two relates persons. Therefore in 
gathering data, the observations that had one 
person or two related parties as chairman of 
the board and managing director/chief 
executive officer were valued by dummy ‘0’. 
While, the observations that had two 
unrelated persons as chairman of the board 
and managing director/chief executive 
officer were valued by dummy ‘1’. 
 
Directors’ Interest (DI) 
 
Though not mandated, it is clearly noted in 
the 2006 Central Bank of Nigeria code of 
corporate governance that the more the 
directors’ shareholding interest in the bank, 
the better the with corporate governance 
principles. Hence, it was further stated that 
the directors are advised to acquire shares in 
the banks they are directing. In data 
gathering, the total shareholding of all the 
directors was summed and expressed as a 
percentage of total shares of the bank.  
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Control Variable  For this research, bank size was considered a 
relevant control variable and it was 
measured by banks’ total assets (TA). 
 
Results 
Table 1: Group correlation of variables 
 
BC BS CI DI ED SC TA NPL LLP LDR
BC 1
BS 0.123205 1
CI 0.118107 0.279182 1
DI 0.004707 -0.2577 -0.25287 1
ED -0.04744 0.088634 0.151354 -0.04262 1
SC 0.021106 0.329219 0.785224 -0.36977 -0.05535 1
TA -0.12685 0.61659 0.359881 -0.20628 0.064152 0.410902 1
NPL 0.090744 -0.13406 0.08398 -0.14757 0.099337 0.140488 -0.21567 1
LLP 0.120809 -0.18278 0.003643 -0.20912 0.140526 -0.00182 -0.26343 0.551591 1
LDR -0.2161 -0.21089 0.02939 0.000911 0.080289 0.100126 -0.20699 -0.00198 -0.12392 1
 
 
O’Brien (2007) explained multicollinearity as 
a statistical phenomenon in which two or 
more predictor variables in a multiple 
regression model are highly correlated. The 
result of the multicollinearity shows that the 
relationship between each of the variable 
sets is negative and at some point positive 
but insignificant.  
 
Test of Hypothesis 1 
H01: There is no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and non–
performing  
 Loans ratio. 
 
CR (NPL)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + βBCit + 
βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit  
 
 
Table 2: Regression output for Hypothesis 1 
 
Dependent Variable: NPL
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2005 2009
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 19
Total panel (balanced) observations: 95
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
BC 0.059467 0.074643 0.796691 0.4278
BS -0.006384 0.00848 -0.752897 0.4535
CI -0.053531 0.071438 -0.749332 0.4557
DI -0.464803 0.393829 -1.180216 0.2411
ED 0.23561 0.1525 1.544984 0.126
SC 0.082197 0.042319 1.942296 0.0553
TA -1.36E-07 6.67E-08 -2.036882 0.0447
C -0.076548 0.208409 -0.367298 0.7143
R-squared 0.153958     Mean dependent var 0.187231
Adjusted R-squared 0.085886     S.D. dependent var 0.208153
S.E. of regression 0.199014     Akaike info criterion -0.310431
Sum squared resid 3.445773     Schwarz criterion -0.095367
Log likelihood 22.74545     Hannan-Quinn criter. -0.223529
F-statistic 2.261684     Durbin-Watson stat 1.442162
Prob(F-statistic) 0.036595
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The coefficients of BS, CI, DI and TA show 
that there is an inverse relationship with 
non–performing loans ratio. This implies that 
as the number of directors on the board 
increases, the ratio of non–performing loans 
to total loans will fall and vice versa. The 
independence of the board committees 
influences a reduction in non–performing 
loans ratio and vice versa. As shareholding 
interests of the directors increase, ratio of 
non–performing loans to total loans falls and 
vice versa; also as bank total assets increase, 
non–performing loans ratio falls and vice 
versa. BC, ED and SC show a positive 
relationship. As the number of non–executive 
directors increases in greater proportion to 
the executive directors, non–performing 
loans ratio increases and vice versa. Clear 
separation of powers between the chairman 
board of directors and the CEO influences an 
increase in non–performing loans ratio. 
Compliance with the statutory committees 
increases the ratio of non–performing loans 
to total loans. 
 
The 0.036595 Prob (F-statistic) is significant 
at 5%, and this represents 95% level of 
significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and non–
performing loans ratio is rejected. Therefore, 
it is concluded that there is a significant 
relationship between corporate governance 
and non–performing loans ratio. The 
regression result proves that as corporate 
governance policies are complied with, there 
is a significant impact on non–performing 
loans ratio. The R-squared proves that 
corporate governance is responsible for 
15.4% change in non–performing loans ratio.  
 
Test of Hypothesis 2 
 
H02: There is no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and loan loss 
 Provision. 
CR (LLP)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + 
βBCit + βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit 
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Table3: Regression Output for Hypothesis 2 
 
Dependent Variable: LLP
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2005 2009
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 19
Total panel (balanced) observations: 95
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
BC 0.530591 0.449667 1.179965 0.2412
BS -0.059084 0.051083 -1.156617 0.2506
CI -0.129804 0.43036 -0.301618 0.7637
DI -6.012821 2.372518 -2.534362 0.0131
ED 1.5665 0.918696 1.705135 0.0917
SC 0.138111 0.254942 0.541735 0.5894
TA -7.32E-07 4.02E-07 -1.821557 0.072
C -3.268773 1.255508 -2.603546 0.0108
R-squared 0.186833     Mean dependent var -2.430938
Adjusted R-squared 0.121406     S.D. dependent var 1.279062
S.E. of regression 1.198908     Akaike info criterion 3.281152
Sum squared resid 125.0521     Schwarz criterion 3.496215
Log likelihood -147.8547     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.368053
F-statistic 2.855581     Durbin-Watson stat 0.95222
Prob(F-statistic) 0.009918
 
 
 
The coefficients of BS, CI, DI and TA show 
that there is an inverse relationship with LLP 
ratio. This implies that as the number of 
directors on the board increases, the ratio of 
LLP falls and vice versa. The independence of 
the board committees influences a reduction 
in LLP ratio and vice versa. The larger the 
shareholding interests of the directors, ratio 
of LLP falls and vice versa; also as bank total 
assets increase, provision for loan losses falls 
and vice versa. BC, ED and SC indicate a 
positive relationship. As the number of non–
executive directors increases in greater 
proportion to the executive directors, LLP 
increases and vice versa. Clear separation of 
powers between the chairman board of 
directors and CEO influences an increase in 
LLP. Compliance with statutory committees 
results in higher LLP ratio.  
The 0.009918 Prob(F-statistic) is significant 
at 1%  and this represents 99% level of 
significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and loan loss 
provision is rejected. Therefore, it is 
concluded that there is a significant 
relationship between corporate governance 
and loan loss provision. The regression result 
proves that as corporate governance 
compliance improves, there is a significant 
impact on provision for loan losses and vice 
versa. The R-squared proves that corporate 
governance is responsible for 18.7% change 
in loan loss provision.  
Test of Hypothesis 3 
 
H03: There is no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and loans to 
deposits 
 ratio. 
CR (LDR)it = α + βSCit+ βCIit + βBSit + 
βBCit + βEDit + βDIit + βTAit +μit  
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Table 4: Regression Output for Hypothesis 3 
Dependent Variable: LDR
Method: Panel Least Squares
Sample: 2005 2009
Periods included: 5
Cross-sections included: 19
Total panel (balanced) observations: 95
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
BC -0.292435 0.133183 -2.195747 0.0308
BS -0.011362 0.01513 -0.750991 0.4547
CI -0.078529 0.127464 -0.616087 0.5394
DI 0.184469 0.702694 0.262517 0.7935
ED 0.346794 0.2721 1.274508 0.2059
SC 0.151086 0.075509 2.000905 0.0485
TA -2.53E-07 1.19E-07 -2.128557 0.0361
C 0.517765 0.371857 1.392376 0.1674
R-squared 0.172743     Mean dependent var 0.613418
Adjusted R-squared 0.106183     S.D. dependent var 0.375594
S.E. of regression 0.355093     Akaike info criterion 0.847581
Sum squared resid 10.96995     Schwarz criterion 1.062644
Log likelihood -32.26008     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.934482
F-statistic 2.595271     Durbin-Watson stat 1.548389
Prob(F-statistic) 0.017647
 
The coefficients of BC, BS, CI and TA show 
that there is an inverse relationship with 
LDR. This implies that as the number of non–
executive directors increases in greater 
proportion to the executive directors, LDR 
decreases and vice versa. As the number of 
directors increases, LDR falls and vice versa. 
The independence of the board committees 
influences a reduction in LDR and vice versa; 
also as bank total assets increase, LDR falls 
and vice versa. DI, ED and SC show a positive 
relationship. As directors’ shareholding 
interests increase, LDR falls and vice versa. 
Clear separation of powers between the 
chairman board of directors and CEO 
influences an increase in LDR. Compliance 
with results in higher LDR. 
 
The 0.017647 Prob (F-statistic) is significant 
at 5%, and this represents 95% level of 
significance. Therefore, the null hypothesis 
that there is no significant relationship 
between corporate governance and loans to 
deposits ratio is rejected. Therefore, it is 
concluded that there is a significant 
relationship between corporate governance 
and loans to deposits ratio. The regression 
result proves that as corporate governance 
compliance improves, there is a significant 
impact on loans to deposits ratio. The R-
squared proves that corporate governance is 
responsible for 17.3% change in loans to 
deposits ratio.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This work aimed at determining the 
relationship that exists between corporate 
governance and credit risk management in 
Nigerian Banks focusing on the financial 
crisis. A model was designed to explain the 
relationship between corporate governance 
and credit risk management, hinging on the 
agency theory. Secondary data were gathered 
from 19 listed Nigerian banks for a 5 year 
period between 2005 and 2009. Corporate 
governance was measured by statutory 
committee, committee independence, board 
size, board composition, executive duality 
and directors’ interest; while credit risk 
management was measured by non–
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performing loans ratio, loan loss provision, 
and loan to deposit ratio. The data were 
analysed by Ordinary least square panel data 
analysis. Findings revealed that banks with 
sound corporate governance practice have 
better credit risk management. Results of the 
hypotheses tests revealed that there is a 
significant relationship between corporate 
governance and credit risk variables: NPL; 
LLP and LDR. These imply that an 
improvement in corporate governance 
practice would result in more efficient 
management of credit risk, hence reduce the 
risk of a financial crisis reoccurrence. In a 
research study by Eduardus et. al. (2007), 
Indonesian banks incorporate significant 
relationship between corporate governance 
and risk management. This supports the 
findings stated above for credit risk 
management in Nigerian banks.  
 
This study was carried out on only 
commercial banks, excluding other financial 
institutions in the country and focus was only 
on credit risk. Further research can be 
carried out on other financial institutions or 
micro-finance banks in Nigeria. Also, other 
risks can be focused on such as; liquidity risk, 
operational risk, market risk, and 
reputational risk. 
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